Post by Wayne Hall on Jul 14, 2023 3:01:02 GMT -5
Sergei Poletayev
globalaffairs.ru/articles/ob-utrate-illyuzij/
On the loss of illusions
The Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has triggered a chain of processes that has led to a global conflict, politically and economically on a scale comparable to world wars. We are probably in the initial phase of this conflict, with more and more players becoming involved as time goes on, but some conclusions can already be drawn now.
Last year was the year when postmodernity collided with the real world. Almost all direct and indirect participants in the Ukrainian crisis have based their domestic and foreign policies on theoretical, highly ideologised constructs, on wishful thinking, and the more so, the more severe the consequences for them.
Let us consider the main players.
Russia
Our first and main illusion is about the contractual capacity of our counterparties. Throughout the post-Soviet period, we have tried to resolve Ukraine in peace on the assumption that this would be better for everyone: the West, on the border with the leading nuclear power, would get a predictable security belt and clear rules of the game along with a high degree of influence on Ukraine; Europe would in addition preserve and strengthen its ties with Russia as its main resource base and a vast market; Ukraine would get the opportunity to softly integrate into Europe while maintaining deep economic and cultural ties with Russia; and Russia, in addition to further gradual integration into the post-Soviet Ukraine, would get the opportunity to integrate with Russia.
Nevertheless, the entire history of post-Soviet Ukraine is a history of backward movement (more on this below); this movement has been irreversible since 2014, and the consistent ignoring of this fact, attempts to override a large-scale historical process by agreements with Kiev and the West have led us to the SWO. What exactly went wrong at the end of February, we will not know for some time. But if Moscow's goal was to solve the Ukrainian problem according to the Georgian scenario - with little blood and within a few days - this goal has obviously not been achieved.
The anti-Russian outpost that was created over thirty years has turned out to be very strong and ready to fight even at the cost of its own destruction - again, contrary to common sense as it is understood in Moscow.
I would like to believe that Moscow's illusions have finally dissipated, and our military and political leadership no longer hopes for the common sense of the West and Kyiv. However, so far, the course of the Strategic Defence Forces suggests rather the opposite: after the February offensive, offensive actions are being carried out only in Donbass, and not along the entire front, but in localised areas - mainly by PMCs and former people's militias of the republics. There is a feeling that during the year we did not really understand what to do next, as if we were waiting for the enemy to get fed up sooner than us and finally start negotiating for real.
Our second illusion is the combat capabilities of the army. The actions of the Russian Armed Forces (RF Armed Forces) in the course of the Strategic Defence Forces are commonly berated in the patriotic environment. But it should be understood that since the time of the Serdyukov reform, our army has not been prepared for a large-scale land conflict with a front line of a couple of thousand kilometres, with the need to conduct all-arms operations of the level of the Great Patriotic War, with the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of people. This cannot be changed overnight. And although the identified shortcomings in the actions of the Russian Armed Forces, the General Staff and the rear are being recognised and somehow eliminated, we have yet to see a full-scale offensive with the decisive goal of defeating the Ukrainian Army (AFU). Perhaps we will see it in the coming year. Perhaps the army is preparing now instead of waiting.
USA
The main illusion of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era is its complete control (or at least dominance) over the processes taking place in the world, and therefore the belief that the degree of consideration of the interests of counterparties is determined in Washington, and only in Washington. Simply put, I will do what I want, and if it is not what I want, I have enough means to coerce and punish those who disobey.
In many ways, this inflexibility has led to the current crisis: if you wanted to, you could make a deal with Russia - face-saving and even to your own economic and political advantage: Moscow was probably prepared to do a lot in return.
In the Middle East, this behaviour has already led the United States to a dramatic weakening of its position; it has made the prospect of conflict with China almost irreversible; and it has laid time bombs in relations with allies in Europe and Asia that are likely to go off in the coming years.
Since World War II, the United States has been building a global system, in some ways a new kind of empire. They have consistently taken control of political and economic processes in the world without encountering much resistance - on the contrary, everyone has sought to integrate into this system, receiving in return some markets and access to cheap money, some a security umbrella and the opportunity not to spend on the army, some the latest technologies.
The United States itself, having found itself in the role of the Earth's metropolis, skimmed the cream off all this, and after several generations the American political class became convinced that such a system was not the result of painstaking labour and consideration of partners' interests, but some kind of birthright, sometimes becoming a burden. Hence the sluggishness, and the further away - the more hysterical American foreign policy, attempts to force others to do things their way and, as a result, the undermining of the world American-centric system.
The U.S. has a solid safety margin, its fodder base is still vast, and alternative global institutions are just beginning to emerge, so we should not expect any noticeable changes in U.S. policy in the coming years, especially since the internal split is rather the opposite, forcing the foreign policy heat to increase.
The second American (as well as European) illusion is that a military conflict on the Ukrainian scale can be won without direct involvement. Yes, the AFU is holding up well, but Russia has so far engaged a small part of its military resources in the NWO, and the degree of escalation on our side is now determined by political decisions, not by military and mobilisation capabilities. If we wish and are ready, we can multiply the onslaught, to which it will be extremely difficult for the West and the United States to respond without direct involvement of their own troops (at least air defence and air force) in the conflict. However, President Biden has repeatedly emphasised that he will not go for such an intervention as long as he is alive.
Europe
Europe's main illusion is that its prosperity over the past decades is its own merit and that it is based on a set of abstract values. In fact, Europe's prosperity has been based on two pillars: the American military, political and economic roof and a cheap resource base, primarily Russian.
The absence of the need to care about their own security, resources and markets, the impossibility of internal conflicts, on the one hand, contributed to an unprecedented economic upsurge, a true golden age, but on the other hand, led to the degeneration of the European elites and the political class, who sincerely believed that this would always be the case and that it was enough to cultivate values and strive to spread them to the entire surrounding backward world.
This explains Europe's stubbornness on the Ukrainian issue - a stubbornness bordering on fanaticism. Europe accepts the most vicious anti-Russian sanctions with the greatest fervour, without considering any damage.
If the United States is borrowing from the future in this crisis, Europe is naturally firing bullets at its own knees.
Here and now, it is depriving itself of a major market, its most important resource base, and is sent into an almost colonial dependence on Washington, which, unlike Europe, has real military power and real control over political and economic processes in the world.
After the West's concerted attempt to give Russia an economic shock and awe has failed, Europe's leaders are at a loss: the same people can talk about the need for a military victory over Russia and the need for diplomatic dialogue a couple of days apart, seemingly without really understanding what "military victory" and "diplomatic dialogue" mean.
The prospect of a multi-year multiple increase in energy prices and, as a consequence, deindustrialisation and falling living standards, the prospect of a trade war with the US in a global recession, the prospect of maintaining a ruined Ukraine for an indefinite number of years, the prospect of hundreds of billions in losses from the loss of accumulated investments in Russia is already sobering, but has not yet led to any decisions - there is simply no one to make and implement them. Plus, the long-standing problems of the European Union, which it stumbled over in previous years, have not gone away: the migration crisis, the constant balancing of southern
Europe on the verge of economic collapse.
globalaffairs.ru/articles/ob-utrate-illyuzij/
On the loss of illusions
The Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, has triggered a chain of processes that has led to a global conflict, politically and economically on a scale comparable to world wars. We are probably in the initial phase of this conflict, with more and more players becoming involved as time goes on, but some conclusions can already be drawn now.
Last year was the year when postmodernity collided with the real world. Almost all direct and indirect participants in the Ukrainian crisis have based their domestic and foreign policies on theoretical, highly ideologised constructs, on wishful thinking, and the more so, the more severe the consequences for them.
Let us consider the main players.
Russia
Our first and main illusion is about the contractual capacity of our counterparties. Throughout the post-Soviet period, we have tried to resolve Ukraine in peace on the assumption that this would be better for everyone: the West, on the border with the leading nuclear power, would get a predictable security belt and clear rules of the game along with a high degree of influence on Ukraine; Europe would in addition preserve and strengthen its ties with Russia as its main resource base and a vast market; Ukraine would get the opportunity to softly integrate into Europe while maintaining deep economic and cultural ties with Russia; and Russia, in addition to further gradual integration into the post-Soviet Ukraine, would get the opportunity to integrate with Russia.
Nevertheless, the entire history of post-Soviet Ukraine is a history of backward movement (more on this below); this movement has been irreversible since 2014, and the consistent ignoring of this fact, attempts to override a large-scale historical process by agreements with Kiev and the West have led us to the SWO. What exactly went wrong at the end of February, we will not know for some time. But if Moscow's goal was to solve the Ukrainian problem according to the Georgian scenario - with little blood and within a few days - this goal has obviously not been achieved.
The anti-Russian outpost that was created over thirty years has turned out to be very strong and ready to fight even at the cost of its own destruction - again, contrary to common sense as it is understood in Moscow.
I would like to believe that Moscow's illusions have finally dissipated, and our military and political leadership no longer hopes for the common sense of the West and Kyiv. However, so far, the course of the Strategic Defence Forces suggests rather the opposite: after the February offensive, offensive actions are being carried out only in Donbass, and not along the entire front, but in localised areas - mainly by PMCs and former people's militias of the republics. There is a feeling that during the year we did not really understand what to do next, as if we were waiting for the enemy to get fed up sooner than us and finally start negotiating for real.
Our second illusion is the combat capabilities of the army. The actions of the Russian Armed Forces (RF Armed Forces) in the course of the Strategic Defence Forces are commonly berated in the patriotic environment. But it should be understood that since the time of the Serdyukov reform, our army has not been prepared for a large-scale land conflict with a front line of a couple of thousand kilometres, with the need to conduct all-arms operations of the level of the Great Patriotic War, with the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of people. This cannot be changed overnight. And although the identified shortcomings in the actions of the Russian Armed Forces, the General Staff and the rear are being recognised and somehow eliminated, we have yet to see a full-scale offensive with the decisive goal of defeating the Ukrainian Army (AFU). Perhaps we will see it in the coming year. Perhaps the army is preparing now instead of waiting.
USA
The main illusion of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era is its complete control (or at least dominance) over the processes taking place in the world, and therefore the belief that the degree of consideration of the interests of counterparties is determined in Washington, and only in Washington. Simply put, I will do what I want, and if it is not what I want, I have enough means to coerce and punish those who disobey.
In many ways, this inflexibility has led to the current crisis: if you wanted to, you could make a deal with Russia - face-saving and even to your own economic and political advantage: Moscow was probably prepared to do a lot in return.
In the Middle East, this behaviour has already led the United States to a dramatic weakening of its position; it has made the prospect of conflict with China almost irreversible; and it has laid time bombs in relations with allies in Europe and Asia that are likely to go off in the coming years.
Since World War II, the United States has been building a global system, in some ways a new kind of empire. They have consistently taken control of political and economic processes in the world without encountering much resistance - on the contrary, everyone has sought to integrate into this system, receiving in return some markets and access to cheap money, some a security umbrella and the opportunity not to spend on the army, some the latest technologies.
The United States itself, having found itself in the role of the Earth's metropolis, skimmed the cream off all this, and after several generations the American political class became convinced that such a system was not the result of painstaking labour and consideration of partners' interests, but some kind of birthright, sometimes becoming a burden. Hence the sluggishness, and the further away - the more hysterical American foreign policy, attempts to force others to do things their way and, as a result, the undermining of the world American-centric system.
The U.S. has a solid safety margin, its fodder base is still vast, and alternative global institutions are just beginning to emerge, so we should not expect any noticeable changes in U.S. policy in the coming years, especially since the internal split is rather the opposite, forcing the foreign policy heat to increase.
The second American (as well as European) illusion is that a military conflict on the Ukrainian scale can be won without direct involvement. Yes, the AFU is holding up well, but Russia has so far engaged a small part of its military resources in the NWO, and the degree of escalation on our side is now determined by political decisions, not by military and mobilisation capabilities. If we wish and are ready, we can multiply the onslaught, to which it will be extremely difficult for the West and the United States to respond without direct involvement of their own troops (at least air defence and air force) in the conflict. However, President Biden has repeatedly emphasised that he will not go for such an intervention as long as he is alive.
Europe
Europe's main illusion is that its prosperity over the past decades is its own merit and that it is based on a set of abstract values. In fact, Europe's prosperity has been based on two pillars: the American military, political and economic roof and a cheap resource base, primarily Russian.
The absence of the need to care about their own security, resources and markets, the impossibility of internal conflicts, on the one hand, contributed to an unprecedented economic upsurge, a true golden age, but on the other hand, led to the degeneration of the European elites and the political class, who sincerely believed that this would always be the case and that it was enough to cultivate values and strive to spread them to the entire surrounding backward world.
This explains Europe's stubbornness on the Ukrainian issue - a stubbornness bordering on fanaticism. Europe accepts the most vicious anti-Russian sanctions with the greatest fervour, without considering any damage.
If the United States is borrowing from the future in this crisis, Europe is naturally firing bullets at its own knees.
Here and now, it is depriving itself of a major market, its most important resource base, and is sent into an almost colonial dependence on Washington, which, unlike Europe, has real military power and real control over political and economic processes in the world.
After the West's concerted attempt to give Russia an economic shock and awe has failed, Europe's leaders are at a loss: the same people can talk about the need for a military victory over Russia and the need for diplomatic dialogue a couple of days apart, seemingly without really understanding what "military victory" and "diplomatic dialogue" mean.
The prospect of a multi-year multiple increase in energy prices and, as a consequence, deindustrialisation and falling living standards, the prospect of a trade war with the US in a global recession, the prospect of maintaining a ruined Ukraine for an indefinite number of years, the prospect of hundreds of billions in losses from the loss of accumulated investments in Russia is already sobering, but has not yet led to any decisions - there is simply no one to make and implement them. Plus, the long-standing problems of the European Union, which it stumbled over in previous years, have not gone away: the migration crisis, the constant balancing of southern
Europe on the verge of economic collapse.