Post by Wayne Hall on Sept 5, 2008 8:39:37 GMT -5
The anxious great power
Politics
www.german-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6984&Itemid=1
Germany’s long road to world politics – By Eric Gujer
Germany lacks the will to act globally, argues the former Berlin correspondent of Switzerland’s Neue Züricher Zeitung. His message boils down to the old battle-cry: “The Germans to the front!”
Almost 20 years after reunification, Germany still hasn’t overcome the destruction wreaked in the former East Germany. But the relationship between the eastern and western part of the country has settled down into calm routine. The laughing fans waving black-red-and-gold flags during the 2006 football World Cup were harbingers of a new Germany that has reconciled with itself and its history.
That is in stark contrast to the country’s policy on the world scene, where Germany is yet to find its role. The fall of the Berlin Wall swept the chess figures of the Cold War off the board. Germany is no longer the ward of the Western allies and no longer has to rely on their protection. The revision of the post-1945 order spelled a loss of status for Russia, France and Britain.
Germany, on the other hand, is one of the winners of the new world order, and no longer draws its strength from economic power alone, as it did during the Cold War. Alongside a handful of other states, Germany now has the critical mass necessary to shape international policy.
The Germany divided by Cold War borders was too important to be left to the Germans. When American and Soviet tanks trained their gun barrels on each other at Checkpoint Charlie, the entire world held its breath – the icy chill of World War III was in the air. Germans in both East and West were sitting on a powder keg and were regarded with suspicion.
The situation today is paradoxical: Germany has gained in importance on the world stage exactly because it has become less important. World peace no longer hinges on Germany. That loss of importance opens up new room for its government to maneuver in international affairs. Germany can use all the instruments to exert influence available to a nation of its size, just like any other country.
German foreign policy is in a transition phase. The country used to be considered a mid-sized European power and that definitely applied to West Germany before 1989. Then, the former West Germany was wary of drawing attention to itself. Although it was Europe’s leading economic power, Bonn showed consideration for the historically justified sensitivities of its neighbors by avoiding even the semblance of any claim to major power status.
But the concept of superpowers, major powers and mid-sized powers is a relic of the Cold War. The United States is now the only remaining world power with a claim to global strategic reach. Alongside it are major powers able to play a prominent role in international politics and function as leading regional powers.
Before 1945, Germany was the strongest power on the continent, but after its defeat in World War II that situation was reversed. Soon after its foundation, the Federal Republic learned how to play politics with its weakness. No matter what it took, the U.S. had to avoid anything that would have exposed the Western rump state to the risk of collapse.
Today, reunified Germany is learning how to shape policy from a position of strength. Power does not automatically lead to its abuse, however understandable that assumption may seem in light of the crimes committed by the Nazis. But the idea that Germany might one day conduct power politics again was taboo.
However, power politics is not necessarily a bad thing. Foreign policy strength also means being able to act as a mediator in the Middle East conflict or being in a position to threaten effective sanctions in the nuclear conflict with Iran.
The idea that Germany could withdraw to a position of neutrality like the much smaller Switzerland and thereby avoid foreign policy conflicts is tempting. While Germany was divided, the wider foreign policy strategy of focusing mainly on economic interests and leaving global issues to the western allies worked well. But Germany can no longer evade the expectations it is faced with.
The international community expects Berlin to participate in the solution to the various regional conflicts – financially, politically, and if need be, militarily. Declining to engage is tantamount to relinquishing all influence.
In modern international diplomacy, there are countless other actors alongside the sovereign states. They include regional organizations like the OSCE and the African Union, the WTO, and informal forums like the G-8, but also important non-governmental organizations that, in conjunction with the media, influence world opinion.
Globalization has caused the number of international consultative bodies to grow almost exponentially. Success in this environment requires partners. As a country without a colonial history, one that also uses its strength sparingly in institutions like the EU, Germany is well placed to form such partnerships.
The importance of being able to conduct a broadly inclusive foreign policy is illustrated by a recent comment from the French international affairs analyst Dominique Moïsi: “The measure of a successful foreign policy is not the number of partners that one has offended or alienated.”
No one can seriously say anything similar about Berlin’s performance on the international stage. On the contrary, Germany is known to often consider itself the advocate of smaller nations, for instance within the EU. That reputation, gained in the 60-year history of the country also represents an obligation to conduct active foreign policy.
Before 1989, it was usually politically expedient not to place too much emphasis on German special interests. The world was quick to sense disaster when the Germans – especially if an action was coordinated between Bonn and East Berlin – launched their own political initiatives. As a result, Bonn officials developed a convoluted secret language completely devoid of the term “special interests” but making frequent use of “peace,” “international understanding” and “multilateral approaches.”
Pushing the EU or the UN into the foreground was part of that mindset. The claim that “there is no German foreign policy, there is only European foreign policy” can still be heard today. Of course, EU convergence is making great strides, with more and more issues decided in Brussels and not in the national capitals – though less so in foreign policy.
But that does not change the fact that each member state first has to define its own position. Hiding behind Brussels only arouses suspicion. Clear, direct language helps to build trust by allowing partners to know what the starting position is.
German foreign policy is slowly learning not to say “we” when it really means “I.” That includes occasional exaggerations and mistakes like former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s attacks on the European Commission.
If Berlin hopes to keep its reputation as the advocate of smaller nations, then a heterogeneous EU, in which majority decision-making makes it increasingly important to forge coalitions, is an advantage for Germany. In this context, modesty is the best special interest policy, although a more resolute stance may be called for in other situations – such as industrial policy debates with Paris.
This may be Germany’s most important new experience since reunification: As long as the country was divided and the victorious powers had the last word on all German policy issues, foreign policy coordinates remained relatively fixed and manageable. Today’s Germany has far more options. At the same time, it has had to learn the hard way that its foreign policy may be at loggerheads with its allies more frequently than in the past.
That is the paradox of being a major power. The more options one has, the more difficult it becomes to pursue a unified foreign policy. Germany’s EU partners expect restraint but also strong leadership. These demands are contradictory but the EU remains the main stage on which German foreign policy has to prove itself.
The German yearning for a foreign policy “master plan” is becoming more and more difficult to fulfill. Officials must determine on a case-by-case basis whether to try and implement policy unilaterally or seek out coalitions, whether to protest vocally or engage in quiet compromise behind the scenes. Gone are the days when Germany was able to define its foreign policy with a few key words: “Never again, never alone.”
The most obvious example of this “new complexity” is Afghanistan, where Germany slid into a conflict which it is not up to yet. Before deploying German troops, the government, concerned that it might not receive political support, created the illusion of a new, peaceful Afghanistan and pretended that the mission was a purely humanitarian one.
Would it have been inconceivable to present a realistic picture of the risks or to admit that German involvement was not only motivated by humanitarian considerations but also by political and strategic reasons?
When it comes to foreign policy, politicians seem to think voters are like children who must be prepared gently for the hard realities of life. With his Agenda 2010, Schröder determined that it was necessary to reform Germany’s social welfare state. He implemented an unpopular program and took the consequences in the polling booths.
In the foreign policy arena, there has been no Agenda 2010. The political parties assume that they won’t be able to explain the necessity of an active policy to a society with isolationist leanings.
Reunified Germany has grown into a major power but it is still clinging to the Biedermeier era ideal of a mid-sized power. The country still lacks the will and the imagination to act globally.
China’s arms build-up, the North Korean nuclear program and the security of shipping lanes between Asia and Europe remain distant issues. When in doubt, Berlin relies on the U.S. to act as the world’s policeman. There is still no awareness that a globally operating economic power like Germany cannot simply leave international politics to other nations.
– From 1998 to 2008, Eric Gujer was the Berlin correspondent of the Neue Züricher Zeitung, Switzerland’s leading daily. He is now the paper’s foreign editor and author of, “Schluss mit der Heuchelei. Deutschland ist eine Großmacht” (Quit being hypocritical. Germany is a great power).
Politics
www.german-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6984&Itemid=1
Germany’s long road to world politics – By Eric Gujer
Germany lacks the will to act globally, argues the former Berlin correspondent of Switzerland’s Neue Züricher Zeitung. His message boils down to the old battle-cry: “The Germans to the front!”
Almost 20 years after reunification, Germany still hasn’t overcome the destruction wreaked in the former East Germany. But the relationship between the eastern and western part of the country has settled down into calm routine. The laughing fans waving black-red-and-gold flags during the 2006 football World Cup were harbingers of a new Germany that has reconciled with itself and its history.
That is in stark contrast to the country’s policy on the world scene, where Germany is yet to find its role. The fall of the Berlin Wall swept the chess figures of the Cold War off the board. Germany is no longer the ward of the Western allies and no longer has to rely on their protection. The revision of the post-1945 order spelled a loss of status for Russia, France and Britain.
Germany, on the other hand, is one of the winners of the new world order, and no longer draws its strength from economic power alone, as it did during the Cold War. Alongside a handful of other states, Germany now has the critical mass necessary to shape international policy.
The Germany divided by Cold War borders was too important to be left to the Germans. When American and Soviet tanks trained their gun barrels on each other at Checkpoint Charlie, the entire world held its breath – the icy chill of World War III was in the air. Germans in both East and West were sitting on a powder keg and were regarded with suspicion.
The situation today is paradoxical: Germany has gained in importance on the world stage exactly because it has become less important. World peace no longer hinges on Germany. That loss of importance opens up new room for its government to maneuver in international affairs. Germany can use all the instruments to exert influence available to a nation of its size, just like any other country.
German foreign policy is in a transition phase. The country used to be considered a mid-sized European power and that definitely applied to West Germany before 1989. Then, the former West Germany was wary of drawing attention to itself. Although it was Europe’s leading economic power, Bonn showed consideration for the historically justified sensitivities of its neighbors by avoiding even the semblance of any claim to major power status.
But the concept of superpowers, major powers and mid-sized powers is a relic of the Cold War. The United States is now the only remaining world power with a claim to global strategic reach. Alongside it are major powers able to play a prominent role in international politics and function as leading regional powers.
Before 1945, Germany was the strongest power on the continent, but after its defeat in World War II that situation was reversed. Soon after its foundation, the Federal Republic learned how to play politics with its weakness. No matter what it took, the U.S. had to avoid anything that would have exposed the Western rump state to the risk of collapse.
Today, reunified Germany is learning how to shape policy from a position of strength. Power does not automatically lead to its abuse, however understandable that assumption may seem in light of the crimes committed by the Nazis. But the idea that Germany might one day conduct power politics again was taboo.
However, power politics is not necessarily a bad thing. Foreign policy strength also means being able to act as a mediator in the Middle East conflict or being in a position to threaten effective sanctions in the nuclear conflict with Iran.
The idea that Germany could withdraw to a position of neutrality like the much smaller Switzerland and thereby avoid foreign policy conflicts is tempting. While Germany was divided, the wider foreign policy strategy of focusing mainly on economic interests and leaving global issues to the western allies worked well. But Germany can no longer evade the expectations it is faced with.
The international community expects Berlin to participate in the solution to the various regional conflicts – financially, politically, and if need be, militarily. Declining to engage is tantamount to relinquishing all influence.
In modern international diplomacy, there are countless other actors alongside the sovereign states. They include regional organizations like the OSCE and the African Union, the WTO, and informal forums like the G-8, but also important non-governmental organizations that, in conjunction with the media, influence world opinion.
Globalization has caused the number of international consultative bodies to grow almost exponentially. Success in this environment requires partners. As a country without a colonial history, one that also uses its strength sparingly in institutions like the EU, Germany is well placed to form such partnerships.
The importance of being able to conduct a broadly inclusive foreign policy is illustrated by a recent comment from the French international affairs analyst Dominique Moïsi: “The measure of a successful foreign policy is not the number of partners that one has offended or alienated.”
No one can seriously say anything similar about Berlin’s performance on the international stage. On the contrary, Germany is known to often consider itself the advocate of smaller nations, for instance within the EU. That reputation, gained in the 60-year history of the country also represents an obligation to conduct active foreign policy.
Before 1989, it was usually politically expedient not to place too much emphasis on German special interests. The world was quick to sense disaster when the Germans – especially if an action was coordinated between Bonn and East Berlin – launched their own political initiatives. As a result, Bonn officials developed a convoluted secret language completely devoid of the term “special interests” but making frequent use of “peace,” “international understanding” and “multilateral approaches.”
Pushing the EU or the UN into the foreground was part of that mindset. The claim that “there is no German foreign policy, there is only European foreign policy” can still be heard today. Of course, EU convergence is making great strides, with more and more issues decided in Brussels and not in the national capitals – though less so in foreign policy.
But that does not change the fact that each member state first has to define its own position. Hiding behind Brussels only arouses suspicion. Clear, direct language helps to build trust by allowing partners to know what the starting position is.
German foreign policy is slowly learning not to say “we” when it really means “I.” That includes occasional exaggerations and mistakes like former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s attacks on the European Commission.
If Berlin hopes to keep its reputation as the advocate of smaller nations, then a heterogeneous EU, in which majority decision-making makes it increasingly important to forge coalitions, is an advantage for Germany. In this context, modesty is the best special interest policy, although a more resolute stance may be called for in other situations – such as industrial policy debates with Paris.
This may be Germany’s most important new experience since reunification: As long as the country was divided and the victorious powers had the last word on all German policy issues, foreign policy coordinates remained relatively fixed and manageable. Today’s Germany has far more options. At the same time, it has had to learn the hard way that its foreign policy may be at loggerheads with its allies more frequently than in the past.
That is the paradox of being a major power. The more options one has, the more difficult it becomes to pursue a unified foreign policy. Germany’s EU partners expect restraint but also strong leadership. These demands are contradictory but the EU remains the main stage on which German foreign policy has to prove itself.
The German yearning for a foreign policy “master plan” is becoming more and more difficult to fulfill. Officials must determine on a case-by-case basis whether to try and implement policy unilaterally or seek out coalitions, whether to protest vocally or engage in quiet compromise behind the scenes. Gone are the days when Germany was able to define its foreign policy with a few key words: “Never again, never alone.”
The most obvious example of this “new complexity” is Afghanistan, where Germany slid into a conflict which it is not up to yet. Before deploying German troops, the government, concerned that it might not receive political support, created the illusion of a new, peaceful Afghanistan and pretended that the mission was a purely humanitarian one.
Would it have been inconceivable to present a realistic picture of the risks or to admit that German involvement was not only motivated by humanitarian considerations but also by political and strategic reasons?
When it comes to foreign policy, politicians seem to think voters are like children who must be prepared gently for the hard realities of life. With his Agenda 2010, Schröder determined that it was necessary to reform Germany’s social welfare state. He implemented an unpopular program and took the consequences in the polling booths.
In the foreign policy arena, there has been no Agenda 2010. The political parties assume that they won’t be able to explain the necessity of an active policy to a society with isolationist leanings.
Reunified Germany has grown into a major power but it is still clinging to the Biedermeier era ideal of a mid-sized power. The country still lacks the will and the imagination to act globally.
China’s arms build-up, the North Korean nuclear program and the security of shipping lanes between Asia and Europe remain distant issues. When in doubt, Berlin relies on the U.S. to act as the world’s policeman. There is still no awareness that a globally operating economic power like Germany cannot simply leave international politics to other nations.
– From 1998 to 2008, Eric Gujer was the Berlin correspondent of the Neue Züricher Zeitung, Switzerland’s leading daily. He is now the paper’s foreign editor and author of, “Schluss mit der Heuchelei. Deutschland ist eine Großmacht” (Quit being hypocritical. Germany is a great power).